We investigate Bayesian and frequentist approaches to resonance searches using a toy model based on an ATLAS search for the Higgs boson in the diphoton channel. We draw pseudo-data from the background only model and background plus signal model at multiple luminosities, from about 0 to 10 6 /fb. We chart the change in the Bayesian posterior of the background only model and the global p-value. We find that, as anticipated, the posterior converges to certainty about the model as luminosity increases. The p-value, on the other hand, randomly walks between 0 and 1 under the background only model. After briefly commenting on the frequentist properties of the posterior, we make a direct comparison of the significances obtained in Bayesian and frequentist frameworks. We find that the well-known look-elsewhere effect reduces local significances by about 1σ. We furthermore find a previously unknown effect: significances from our Bayesian framework are typically about 1 -2σ smaller than the global significances. This suggests that even global significances could significantly overstate the evidence against the background only model. This effectthe Bayes effect -could radically change our interpretation of the evidence for new physics in resonance searches. We checked that the effect was robust with respect to thirteen choices of prior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Resonances are narrow peaks in the invariant mass distributions of pairs of particles detected in, for example, a collider experiment. As a resonance originates from the onshell production and subsequent decay of a massive particle, a new resonance indicates the discovery of a new particle, as was the case in 2012 when the Higgs boson was discovered [1, 2] at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). New resonances typically lie above a background of events originating from well-understood physical processes. Unfortunately, upwards statistical fluctuations in that background can, by chance, imitate a resonance. Thus to discover a particle we must distinguish fluctuations from genuine resonances.
The ATLAS and CMS experiments at the LHC use null hypothesis significance testing to determine whether there is a new resonance in an invariant mass distribution. This methodology, reviewed in sec. III, invokes hypothetical pseudo-experiments conducted with no resonance. If the fraction of pseudo-experiments that would result in data as extreme as that observed (the so-called p-value) lies below a threshold, we reject the possibility that there is no resonance, and herald a discovery. In light of historical (see e.g., ref. [3] ) and recent (see e.g., ref. [4] ) criticism, we recently advocated [5, 6] an alternative methodology based on Bayes factors, reviewed in sec. IV. In this methodology, we consider only the observed data, and simply directly compare the plausibility of that data in a model with a resonance to that in one without one. This allows us to calculate, amongst other things, the plausibility of the background only model [7] .
In ref. [5] we considered the infamous 750 GeV anomaly, when ATLAS and CMS saw hints of a resonance in the invariant mass distribution of photons at 750 GeV. This would have been a historic discovery and it generated considerable activity (see e.g., ref. [8] for a review). Looking at ATLAS * Andrew.J.Fowlie@qq.com data [9, 10] , we found that whilst the p-value of about 0.02 appeared suggestive, for our choices of priors the posterior of the background model was in fact about 0.2. The anomaly ultimately disappeared once more data was collected [11] . Similarly, in ref. [6] , we considered a hint for a resonance in the invariant mass spectrum of electrons measured by the DAMPE satellite [12] . The hint could be the first direct evidence for dark matter. We again found that for our choices of priors the posterior of the background, about 0.3, was significantly greater than the p-value, about 0.01.
With these two cases in mind, in this work we investigate the behavior of the posterior of the background and the p-value in resonance searches. In sec. II we present a toy example of a resonance search based on one in which ATLAS discovered the Higgs boson [13] . We review the frequentist and Bayesian methods for analyzing this toy problem in sec. III and sec. IV, respectively, and apply them to real and pseudo-data from it in sec. V, showing how results change as the dataset grows (see ref. [14] for a similar analysis in a different context), and differences between the statistical approaches. We find, remarkably, that the plausibility of the background only model is typically orders of magnitude greater than the p-value. This echoes criticisms that p-values overstate the evidence for effects in other fields (see e.g., ref. [4, 15] ). We do not in this work address in detail further criticisms of either methodology, e.g., the dependence of Bayes factors on choices of prior (see e.g., ref. [16, 17] ), though discuss prior sensitivity of our findings in sec. VI. We summarize our findings in sec. VII.
II. TOY PROBLEM -ATLAS DIPHOTON SEARCH FOR A HIGGS BOSON
We consider a historic ATLAS [13] served spectrum is shown in fig. 1 . The spectrum (red points) exhibits a suggestive resonance-like feature at 125 GeV. We consider two models for the data. First, a background only model, M 0 , representing the background from known Standard Model (SM) processes other than a Higgs boson. ATLAS model the background by a Bernstein polynomial. This introduces several unknown coefficients. So that we can perform millions of fits, we instead fix them to their best-fit values and thus omit parametric uncertainties in the background. Second, a background plus signal model, M 1 . This is the background spectrum plus a narrow resonance, i.e., one with a width, Γ, that is substantially narrower than the experimental resolution of about 1.5 GeV. We thus approximate the width as zero, Γ ≈ 0. We know the expected amplitude of a resonance from an SM-like Higgs boson. We choose to model a Higgs-like signal with only two a priori unknown parameters: the mass of the Higgs, m h , and the amplitude of the signal relative to the SM, µ. The observed data is a set of counts, o i , in each of 30 bins in diphoton invariant mass spanning m γγ = 100 -160 GeV. We denote the expected number of background events per bin by b i . In the signal model, the expected number of events is the sum of the expected number of background events and signal events, s i ,
The expected signal is scaled by the signal strength, and itself depends on the Higgs mass by
where L = 25/fb is the integrated luminosity, σ is the total production cross section, is the selection efficiency, and φ is the shape of the signal, which we model by a Gaussian centered at the Higgs mass, m h , with a width of 1.5 GeV, governed by the experimental resolution. We pick a Gaussian for simplicity; ATLAS in fact use a Crystal Ball function with Gaussian tails. We found σ × 22.3 fb heuristically by reproducing the ATLAS result at m h = 125 GeV.
Thus the likelihood of the observed events is the product of 30 Poisson likelihoods, one for each bin,
where λ i , is the expected number of events in bin i . We stress that this is a toy treatment of the problem, intended to capture only the major details, that omits e.g., systematic uncertainties or a detailed treatment of the selection efficiency and cross section as functions of the Higgs mass.
III. FREQUENTIST
In the frequentist framework, we construct a log likelihood ratio test-statistic,
where the hats indicate the best-fitting value of a parameter. Using the likelihood in eq. 3, we have that
The global p-value is the probability of obtaining a teststatistic at least as extreme as that observed, assuming that the background only model is true,
The local p-value, on the other hand, supposes that we knew beforehand about the best-fitting Higgs mass,m h , and would only ever test that Higgs mass. The p-value is distributed uniformly under the background only model. Thus, if we reject the background model only when the p-value lies below a threshold specified in advance,
the threshold α is the type-1 error rate, i.e., the probability of rejecting the background model when it is true. The p-value itself though has no frequentist or Bayesian meaning: it is not an error rate or the probability of the background only model [18] . In high-energy physics, p-values are informally interpreted as a continuous measure of evidence against the background only model, though discoveries traditionally require a p-value below about 10 −7 , corresponding to 5σ [19] . To calculate p-values, we make use of two formulas. For local p-values, we use an asymptotic formula [20] Local
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. For global p-values, we try a bootstrap technique. If the resulting p-value lies below 0.01, we make use of the Gross-Vitells technique [21] , which should be more precise than bootstrap in that regime,
We determine the a priori unknown parameter N through Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations in the usual manner. This formula accounts for a one-dimensional look-elsewhere effect in the Higgs mass. Finally, we convert p-values to Z-values, as is conventional, using a one-tailed Gaussian rule,
IV. BAYESIAN MODEL COMPARISON
This is nothing other than the direct application of probability theory. We consider the probability of the data in each model -the so-called Bayesian evidence. For the signal model, we must marginalize the a priori unknown Higgs mass and signal strength,
where the second factor in the integrand is our choice of prior density for the Higgs mass and signal strength. For the background model, it is trivial, as there are no free parameters, so the evidence is given directly by eq. 6. Clearly, the evidence for the signal model depends upon our choice of prior. For the mass, we focused on the narrow range searched by ATLAS of 100 GeV to 160 GeV -choices that extend this range simply dilute the evidence for the signal model. Since it did not span multiple decades, we picked a flat prior. For the signal strength, we imagined a scenario in which we expected it to be somewhat close to the SM prediction of µ = 1, though could deviate by a couple of orders of magnitude. We thus picked a broad prior that was flat in logarithmic space between 10 −2 and 10 2 . We investigate choices of prior in sec. VI.
With the evidences, we calculate the Bayes factor,
This is the impact of the data on the relative plausibility of models M 1 and M 0 . To facilitate a comparison with p-values, we find the posterior of the background model,
From hereon we assume that the models are a priori equally plausible, P (M 1 ) = P (M 2 ). Usually, however, we advocate reporting only Bayes factors, since they are independent of the priors for the models themselves. We, furthermore, convert the posterior into a Z-value -which we call the Bayesian significance -using the rule in eq. 11. We do not advocate this in general and do so only to communicate our results to particle physicists so used to thinking of anomalies in terms of the number of sigmas. There exists a bound on the rate at which we would be mislead by the posterior about the true model [22] . With two models under consideration that are equally plausible a priori, if model M 0 is correct, the chance that we find a posterior for M 0 that is less than a threshold t is bounded by
The general bound depends on the number of models considered and the prior odds between the models. For our toy problem, there exists a lower bound on the posterior of the background obtainable with any priors for the mass and signal strength. The posterior is minimized when the priors select the best-fitting mass and strength, such that
where q is the test-statistic defined in eq. 4. Finally, we note that the p-value considers the probability that the test-statistic exceeds a threshold, i.e, the probability of
rather than the probability of obtaining the observed data or observed test-statistic. To aid our comparisons between Bayesian and frequentist procedures, we compute the posterior of the background assuming this coarse-grained information, i.e., we calculate
Coarse-grained posterior of background ≡ P (M 0 | E ) . (18) In the Bayesian context, conditioning upon E is strange as we should condition upon all that we know, i.e., the observed data itself. There is a gulf between knowing the data and knowing only that the data was in the set E (see ref. [23] for further discussion). This is useful though as if the models are equally plausible a priori,
where P (E | M 1 ) may be calculated using asymptotic formulae developed for frequentist applications. If the signal model typically predicts substantial signals, we anticipate that P (E | M 1 ) ≈ 1, such that for small p-values the coarsegrained posterior approximately equals the p-value.
V. RESULTS
We begin in fig. 2 by investigating the change in the p-value and posterior of the background as the integrated luminosity grows. First, we sampled data from the background only model, performing 10 k pseudo-experiments at 50 luminosities between about 0/fb and 10 6 /fb. As we increased the luminosity, we added events to existing data sets, such that they were correlated. At each luminosity, we found the median and 1σ interval for the posterior of the background model and the p-value. We found that the posterior increases monotonically from 0.5 to 1 as the luminosity increases, with a narrow interval (top left panel), i.e., as the luminosity grows, the true model is increasingly favored. The rate of convergence, however, is slow; it takes about 10 5 /fb before any strong preference for the background emerges. The p-value, on the other hand, makes a random walk, with a median of 0.5 regardless of the luminosity (bottom left panel).
Second, we sampled data from the signal model, assuming a signal strength µ = 1 and a mass m h = 125 GeV. Surprisingly, the posterior first increases from 0.5, before rapidly decreasing to 0 once the luminosity exceeds about 10/fb (upper right panel). The initial increase in the posterior is, however, mild; the median reaches about 0.6, which shouldn't be considered worth more than a bare mention [24] . The p-value, on the other hand, decreases monotonically to 0 (lower right panel) though within a substantial 1σ interval. As the signal and background models are similar at small luminosities, the interval for the p-value at small luminosities is similar to that when the background model is true. We show a random subset of MC realizations (dashed lines), illustrating possible trajectories of the p-value and posterior.
We continue by performing 100 k pseudo-experiments under the background only model and signal model assuming a signal strength µ = 1 and a mass m h = 125 GeV, at integrated luminosities of 0.25/fb, 2.5/fb, 12.5/fb, 25/fb, 50/fb and 250/fb, though this time the datasets are completely independent. In fig. 3 we show the resulting distributions of the posterior and p-value at 2.5/fb. Surprisingly, the posterior peaks at about 0.6 under the signal and background models, though under the latter mildly greater posteriors are favored. Thus, even when the signal model is true, the posterior typically mildly favors the background model. The p-value on the other hand is flat under the background distribution, but peaks near 0 under the signal model, with a substantial tail extending to 1. At 25/fb, shown in fig. 4 In fig. 5 we consider the type-1 error associated with the posterior, i.e., if we placed a threshold on the posterior, what is the type-1 error rate? We see that this depends on the luminosity, though for all luminosities below posteriors of about 0.5, the type-1 error rate is substantially less than the posterior and the bound in eq. 15. Thus, although in the Bayesian framework we relinquish direct control over the type-1 error rate, we find no evidence that a threshold on the posterior would lead to significant type-1 error rates in this setting [25] . Lastly, in fig. 6 , we contrast the results from Bayesian and frequentist approaches. We scatter the ratios between the posterior of the background only model and p-value against the p-values from 100 k pseudo-experiments at 0.25/fb, 2.5/fb, 12.5/fb, 25/fb, 50/fb and 250/fb (top panel, blue points). We do not find any significant differences in the relationship between p-value and posterior at different luminosities and thus scatter them together [26] . The global p-values are significantly smaller than the associated posterior of the background by about 100 -1000 for p-values smaller than about 0.01. Whilst both are extremely small, the observed p-value is about 400 times smaller than the posterior (red star). We furthermore show that the minimum posterior obtainable with any priors for the Higgs mass and signal strength lies slightly below the global p-value (green points). We return to the issue of priors in sec. VI. Lastly, we show the effect of conditioning only upon the fact that the test-statistic was greater than the observed test-statistic, eq. 17. This puts the exact information used in the calculation of the p-value into the Bayesian one. We see that in this case the posteriors and p-values (red points) are extremely similar, suggesting that this -and not prior information or differences in interpretation of probability -may be the origin of the differences between the posteriors and p-values.
We convert posteriors and p-values to Z-values by the onetailed rule in eq. 11. We show the difference between the global significance and the Bayesian one (bottom panel of fig. 6 ) as a function of the global significance. For global significances greater than about 1σ the difference is at least 1σ and peaks at over 2σ when the global significance is about 2σ. We call this the Bayes effect; global significances of about 2σ vanish and even a global significance of 5σ, the discovery threshold, reduces to about 4σ. The Bayes effect appears as important as the look-elsewhere effect in resonance searches (blue points) which reduces local significances by a similar amount [27] . There is spread in the Bayesian significance as it is a function of the entire dataset and not only the teststatistic. The Bayes effect occurs regardless of whether data were generated from the background (dark colors) or signal model (light colors) and at all luminosities under consideration.
VI. SENSITIVITY TO OUR CHOICES OF PRIOR
The posterior of the background only model depends upon choices of prior for the Higgs mass and signal strength. To check whether the Bayes effect was an artifact of our particular choices, we repeated our simulations at 25/fb with twelve alternative choices of prior:
1. We halved the breadth of the prior for the signal strength.
2. We doubled the breadth of the prior for the signal strength.
3. We picked a logarithmic prior for the Higgs mass.
4. -5. We picked a Gaussian prior for the order of magnitude of the signal strength, centered at ln µ = 0. We made two choices for the width, σ ln µ = 1 and σ ln µ = 4.
6. -8. We picked a fat-tailed distribution, a Cauchy truncated to allow only positive values, for the signal strength.
We centered it at µ = 1, representing prior knowledge that µ ≈ 1 and made two choices for the width, γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.5. We furthermore picked one representing prior information that was faulty: µ = 0.5 with a width γ = 0.1.
9. -11. We picked a Gaussian prior for the Higgs mass, centered at m h = 125 GeV. We made two choices for the width, σ = 1 GeV and σ = 10 GeV. We again picked one representing information that was faulty: m h = 140 GeV with a width σ = 5 GeV.
12. Finally, we considered a prior representing accurate, precise prior information about the mass and strength: Gaussians centered at m h = 125 GeV and µ = 1 with widths 1 GeV and 0.1, respectively.
The priors represented different possible states of knowledge about the Higgs mass and coupling strength; from vague knowledge, represented by broad priors, to specific information about their likely values, represented by distributions peaked at e.g., µ = 1 or m h = 125 GeV. If we specified the prior for only the Higgs mass or signal strength, we used the choice of prior introduced in sec. IV for the other. We show the resulting Bayes effects in fig. 7 . We first consider vague priors (green colors). The Bayes effect shows mild dependence on the prior. For substantial global significances the effect is stronger for broader priors, e.g., the effect was biggest for a logarithmic prior on the signal strength between 10 −4 and 10 4 (prior 2) and weakest for a log-normal prior that favored a particular order of magnitude (prior 4). This was anticipated as the evidence for the signal model could be diluted by picking a broader prior, enhancing the posterior of the background model. Global significances of about 1 -4σ, however, were always reduced by at least about 1σ.
Second, we considered priors representing hypothetical specific prior knowledge about the Higgs mass or signal strength (red colors). In this case, the behavior depends strongly on whether data was generated under the signal or background model, since the latter may generate resonance-like features that do not agree with our prior knowledge for the mass and strength of the resonance. We find that for data generated under the signal model, specific correct knowledge reduces the Bayes effect, since it reduces the Occam factor. For data generated under the background model, however, the Bayes effect could be amplified, as the posterior of the background is enhanced if the anomaly is not in accord with prior knowledge, regardless of its global significance. This resulted in substantial variation in the posterior associated with a particular global significance (see e.g., prior 6 and prior 9).
If we had roughly known both the Higgs mass and signal strength in advance (prior 12), there would be only a minor Bayes effect under the signal model if the global significance was greater than about 4σ. The Bayes effect could, however, reduce global significances of about 2σ to nothing. Under the background model, the Bayes effect was potentially dramatic, reducing global significances of about 3σ to strong evidence against the signal model, though showed substantial variance.
Finally, we consider specific but faulty prior information. Under the signal model this enhances the posterior of the background and thus the Bayes effect, since the prior information conflicts with the observed resonance-like feature. For the prior centered at m h = 140 ± 5 GeV (prior 11), the Bayes effect becomes dramatic, reducing global significances of 5σ to about 3σ.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We compared Bayesian and frequentist approaches to resonance searches using toy experiments based on a Higgs search in the diphoton channel. We first found two pedagogical results. First, with increasing luminosity, we showed that the Bayesian posterior always converges to overwhelming favor the correct model, whereas the p-value makes a random walk if the null is true, and otherwise converges to 0. Second, we showed frequentist properties of the Bayesian posterior, helping shed light on Bayesian results for those with frequentist mindsets. We found that the type-1 error rate from a threshold on the posterior, whilst not under direct control, was significantly less than the threshold, i.e., if we reject the background only model when the posterior is less than 0.05, the type-1 error rate is significantly less than 0.05 in this setting.
Our final finding, however, was startling; in our canonical resonance search toy problem, global significances were typically greater than those from our Bayesian framework by about 1σ to 2σ, e.g., anomalies that appear at global significance of 3σ correspond to only about 1σ evidence in the Bayesian framework. This effect -which we call the Bayes effect -was robust with respect to six vague choices of priors for the mass and signal strength, though slightly decreased when the breadth of the prior was reduced. For our seven choices representing specific prior knowledge about the mass or strength, we found that the effect persisted, though its magnitude strongly depended on whether the prior information conflicted with the observed resonancelike feature.
We showed that when we discarded information, and worked assuming that we only knew that the test-statistic was at least as big as a threshold, we found extremely similar results from Bayesian and frequentist methods. This suggests that the Bayes effect originates from the fact that p-values use only the fact that the test-statistic was at least as big as that observed, whereas the posterior uses the exact observed data. The Bayes effect should dramatically change our interpretation of global significances as evidence for new physics in resonance searches. 
